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REVELATION AND INSPIRATION:
THE LIBERAL MODEL
FERNANDO L. CANALE
Andrews University

The purpose of this article is to describe the broad characteristics
of the liberal model of revelation-inspiration as it relates to the epistemological origin of Holy Scripture and evaluate it along with the
classical model described in my earlier article.' The question before us
still is the same that prompted the analysis of the classical model: Is a
new theoretical interpretation of the epistemological origin of Scripture
necessary? Would it not be more practical and effective to choose one
of the many available interpretations?
Philosophical and cultural developments of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries led to the formulation of a new approach to biblical interpretation, namely the historical-critical method. According to
Gerhard Ebeling, this method, along with its corresponding model of
revelation-inspiration, attained "well-nigh undisputed dominancen
I
already during the second half of the nineteenth ~ e n t u r y .This
~
referred to earlier as the "liberal (encounter-existential)" model. We must

ernan an do L. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," AUSS 32
(1994): 7-28.
2~erhard
Ebeling, Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963), 18. Even though
the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation was a product of the Enlightenment
(see Gerhard Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed.
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19771, 18-23), its development did not require a new model of
revelation-inspiration(cf. Hug, 14-15). Critical evaluation of the historical-critical method
must be developed on the level of philosophical presuppositions. To note, as did Eta
Linneman, that the method works "as if there were not God," bringing the Bible to the
same level as other human literary productions, or that it lets everyday experience determine what is reality and what is not, cannot suffice (Historical Criticism of the Bible
Methodology or Ideology? [Grand Rapids: Baker, 19901, 84, 88). These characteristics, true
though they may be, stand on the basis of (1) carefully developed philosophical principles
and (2) a new way of understanding revelation-inspiration.If the historical-critical method
is to be challenged, more than a mere return to the classic interpretation of the presuppositional structure and a moderate view of verbal inspiration (ibid., 144) is required.
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now turn our attention to its presuppositional structures and the
specific elements that characterize it.3

1. Presuppositional Structure of the Libmal Model
During the Enlightenment period, new philosophical trends began
to criticize, challenge, modify, and replace some of the basic principles
on which the classical interpretation of the presuppositional structure
were grounded. Following Ren6 Descartes' turn to the subject, classical
realism was rejected and replaced by different forms of idealism. More
significant, however, was the epistemology's radical departure from
intellectualism. Reason was reinterpreted by limiting its reach to the
space-time continuum.
Immanuel Kant, reinterpreting reason, argued that the intellect did
not have the capability of reaching into the timeless nature of ultimate
. ~ for classical theology, ultimate
reality (essence or second ~ u s i a )Since
reality in nature and supernature was timeless, Kant's limitation of
reason's power to the realm of spatio-temporal reality deprived the
Classical Model of revelation-inspiration of its basic ground. As stated
by Hendrikus Berkhof, Kant's foundational work also constituted "a
radical new beginning for evangelical theology. As a result of its
appearance, orthodox scholasticism, rationalism, and supernaturalism
found that at a single stroke, the road forward had been blocked."
Furthermore, Kant's philosophical structure required "the modern way
of posing questions, and modern methodology, in the~logy."~
His
3 ~ o r m a nL. Geisler identifies and discusses Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes,
Benedict Spinoza, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant as contributors in the development
of the new philosophical ideas that lie at the basis of the liberal conception of revelationinspiration ("Philosophical Presuppositions of Biblical Errancy," in Inerrancy, ed. Norman
L. Geisler [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 19791, 312-327). William Nix,working with trends
rather than philosophers, identifies pietism, deism, materialism, naturalism, skepticism,
agnosticism, romanticism, idealism, and existentialism as ideological trends that lead to
liberal theology ("The Doctrine of Inspiration since the Reformation, Part 11: Changing
Climates of Opinion," JETS 27 [1984]: 441-456). He concludes that "between the early
seventeenth and early twentieth centuries a series of changes in the climates of opinion
gradually pre ared the gound for a direct and open confrontation between religion and
science over rRe issues of revelation, inspiration and the authority of Scripture" (457).
4~mmanuelKant, Critzque of Pure Reason (London: J . M . Dent and Sons, 1939), 54.
5~endrikusBerkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology Report of a Personal Journey,
tr. by John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 1989), 1-2. For an introduction to
Kant's thought specifically written for theologians see Royce Gordon Gruenler, Meaning
and Understanding: fie Philosophical Framework for Biblical Intwpretation, Foundations
of Contemporary Interpretation Series, 2 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 35-45; Stanley
Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century 7heology: God and the WorM in a Transitional
Age [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 19921, 26-31; and Berkhof, 1-18.
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philosophy includes, on one hand, the timeless nature of God and his
truth, which is still uncritically accepted, and on the other hand, the
limitation of man's reason to the spatio-temporal realm that does not
allow for cognitive contact between man's reason and a timeless or
supernatural object. The result of Kant's epistemological revolution was
the conclusion that cognitive revelation of supernatural truths is
impossible. Moreover, neither natural theology nor metaphysics, with
their proofs of God's existence, could be fitted into this new philosophical interpretation of the presuppositional structure. Briefly put, the
'Copernican revolution" produced by Kant occurred within the epistemological rather than the ontological realm. The existence of God and
of the human soul are maintained, as is the classical timeless interpretation of their natures; what is disavowed in Kant's epistemological
revolution is the possibility for a cognitive communication between
God and man6
2. Revelation in the Liberal Model
Kantian epistemology, when accepted, seems to render impossible
any attempt to explain revelation. Since Christian theology has rather
uncritically assumed that the role of extra-biblical philosophy in
theology is to provide the interpretation of the presuppositional
structure required for its development, Kant's revolution became a
challenge that Christian theology, sooner or later, had to evaluate. The
problem consisted, basically, in the fact that philosophy was criticizing
and reinterpreting its classical views. Christian theology is still faced
with the same question: Which interpretation of the presuppositional
structure should be chosen? The choice cannot be made on rational
absolute grounds, but rather in terms of preferences or traditions. Those
who still believe that the classical interpretation of the presuppositional
structure is to be chosen become "conservatives"; those who believe that
the Kantian interpretation should be chosen became 'liberals."
The first questions that a liberal theologian must answer regard
whether revelation-inspiration is possible and what is its nature.
Moreover, the place of Scripture as source of theology also needs
clarification. Is it possible, then, to accept the new Kantian definition
of the presuppositional structure and at the same time to claim the
possibility and existence of divine revelation?

ant, Critique of Pure Reason, 46. "Kant, the greatest philosopher of the
movement, denied the very possibility of factual knowledge concerning a super-sensible
order, and this appeared to seal the fate of the historic doctrine of revelation" (JamesI.
Packer, "Contemporary Views of Revelation," 92). See also Carl F. Henry, "Divine
Revelation," 261, 267.
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Friedrich Schleierrnacher,"the father of Modern Theology," undertook the difficult task of creating a new conception of revelation on the
basis of Kant's rejection of classical intellectualism.' Schleiermacher not
only provided the new model, but also developed it in a technical
fashion that is still at the foundation of the many ways in which
revelation has been interpreted within the tradition of liberal theology.8
On the foundation laid by Schleierrnacher, other theologians
contributed both to the formulation and increasing popularity of the
liberal model of revelation and inspiration, among then notably Rudolf
Otto, Martin Buber, Emil Brunner, and Karl Ba~-th.~
We must now
query what are the main features of the liberal model of the epistemological origin of Scripture as expressed by Schleierrnacher,Otto, Buber,
Brunner, and Barth. No attempt to develop in depth the doctrine of
these representatives of the liberal model is attempted. Our search is
rather for the basic structure of the model they all represent."

Divine Activity
The liberal model of revelation-inspiration does not challenge or
change the classical understanding of God." God is still conceived to be
'For an introduction to Schleiermacher's thought, see Richard R. Niebuhr,
"Friedrich Schleiermacher," in A Handbook of Christian Theologians, enlarged edition, ed.
Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 17-35; Schleiermacher
on Christ and Religion (New York: Scribner's, 1964); and Keith Clements, Friedrich
Schleiermacher: Pioneer of Modern Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1987).
8The central role played by Schleiermacher as the founder of the liberal model of
theology is underlined, for instance, by Gnuse, 9; Abraham, "Inspiration, Revelation and
Divine Action: A Study in Modern Methodist Theology," 47; and Packer, "Contemporary
Views of Revelation," 92.
9~ am aware that in his Church Dogmatics (CD), Barth consciously attempted to
depart from liberal theology as conceived by Schleiermacher. For instance, Barth explicitly
rejected the specific way in which Schleiermacher explained some aspects of the human
contribution in the epistemological origin of Scripture (W, I/1, 126). His theological
approach departs from Schleiermacherian liberal theology in substantial aspects and
properly deserves the designation Neo-Orthodox. However different Barth's and Brunner's
general approaches to theology may be from those of 18th- and 19th-century liberal
theologies on the issue of the epistemological origin of Scripture, the differences do not
seem to reveal a different model but rather a more complete and explicit formulation of
the liberal model originated by Schleiermacher.

lo~egarding
the way in which the idea of "theological model" is utilized in this
article see Canale, 8-10.

lato to's two-world theory can be detected at the base of the liberal model of theology. Regarding Plato's influence on Schleiermacher's thought, see, e.g., Terrence N. Tice,
"Introduction," in On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, by Friedrich Schleiermacher, tr. Richard Crouter (Cambridge, Engl.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25.
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"absolutely timeless."12 Divine activity, consequently, is understood to
operate within the timeless level of reality. "By the Eternity of God,"
Schleiermacher states, "we understand the absolutely timeless causality
of God, which conditions not only all that is temporal but time itself
as well."13 The way in which the Bible presents God's causality within
history cannot be integrated by the presuppositonal structure of the
liberal model. This is why Schleiermacherremarks that "divine causality
is only equal in compass to the finite in so far as it is opposite to it in
kind, since if it were like it in kind, as it is often represented as being
in anthropomorphic ideas of God, it too would belong to the sphere of
interaction and thus be a part of the totality of the natural order."14
Yet, divine activity "extends as widely as the order of nature and the
finite causality contained in it." Applying this concept of divine activity
rigorously, Schleiermacher concludes that God's creation "must be
represented as the event in time which conditions all change," yet, must
do so without making "the divine activity itself a temporal activity."15
Consequently, any idea that may suggest a temporal sequence in God's
activity must be consistently eliminated.16This is the kind of divine
activity that generates revelation.
Rudolf Otto strengthened Schleiermacher's view by emphasizing
the otherness of the reality causing revelation in man. This objective
reality, which tradition calls God, Otto designates as the "numinous."17
This "numinous" objective reality "outside the self* is qualified as
"Mysterium Tremend~m."'~
"Mysterium" means in a pure negative sense
"that which is beyond conception or understanding, extraordinary and
unfamiliar."19 "Tremendum" means "absolute unapproachability" and
"absolute overpoweringness."20Moreover, the "numinous" is character12~hereis no doubt that Schleiermacher subscribed to the absolute timelessness of
God. In this regard, see his brief but clear and well-articulated presentation (The Christian
Faith, tr. from the 2d German ed. (1830) by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart
(Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark. 1928), § 52, 1-2 and postscript.

16see, e.g., ibid., § 42.1-2.

"~udolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inqtriry into the Non-Rational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Ratiml, tr. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford,
1923), 11.
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ized as the "'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own."21Otto and Barth understand the divine as that
reality which absolutely differs from nature and humanity. In so doing
they not only assume the traditional conception of the timelessness of
God but bring it to its most extreme expression. As in the case of
Schleiermacher,Otto's "numinous wholly other" cannot act historically
in history but only as the transcendent cause of human religious
experiences.

Buber interprets the whole of reality in relational terms. I-it refers
to the nonrelational world of things in nature and history.22 I-thou
refers to the world of relations.23"The world of It is set in the context
of space and time. The world of 7bou is not set in the context of either
of these."24Knowledge and words belong to the world of It.25What
man in the world of It (knowledge) calls God, Otto identifies in the
world of reality (ontology) as the Eternal tho^.'^ Buber not only
affirms the timeless nature of the Eternal Thou but, agreeing with Otto
and Barth, understands Him as the absolutely transcendent wholly
other.27This God does not act historically in history. To act historically
in history corresponds to Buber's nonpersonal world of It. God's
action is directly consummated in our own I through the mediation of
of all beings.28In other words God acts "personally" in the
the BOU

2 2 " ~experience,
s
the world belongs to the primary word I-it" (Martin Buber, I a d
Thou, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith [New York: Scribner's, 19371, 6). "The history of the
individual and that of the human race, in whatever they may continually part company,
agree at least in this one respect, that they indicate a progressive augmentation of the
world of It" (ibid., 31).
23"Theprimary word I-Thou establishes the world of relation" (ibid., 6). According
to Buber the I-Thou world of relations includes three spheres: nature, humankind, and
intelligible forms (ibid). God, being the Eternal Thou, does not belong to the world of
relation but as the Wholly Other is the transcendent cause of all relations and the world
of "It" as well.
24~bid.,33 and 100.

27~bid.,79. This absolute transcendence of God's being includes the closeness of real
immanence to the point that panentheistic overtones seem to be at least implied in Buber's
concept of God as Eternal Thou. Consider for instance the following statement: "Of
course God is the 'wholly Other'; but He is also the wholly Same, the wholly Present.
Of course He is the Mysterium Tremendum that appears and overthrows; but He is also
the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I" (ibid.).
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timeless dimension of the 'Ilbou. As will be seen below under the essence
of revelation, "personal" refers to something that occurs logically on an
existential (ontic) noncognitive level prior to its presence on the
cognitive level of which it is the objective cause.
Emil Brunner, following Buber's analysis, also understands God as
"pure 'Thou,'"29as "absolute Subject."" Even though rejecting a timeless
interpretation of God in a Platonic sense, Brunner is still unable to
overcome the traditional timeless interpretation of God's eternity.)' For
God, says Brunner, "the temporal-the separation into past, present, and
future-do[es] not exist."32In this context God's revelatory activity is
conceived to have "always and everywhere the character of a sudden
event. It stands out from all ordinary happenings, from the 'normal'
course of development, and is a kind of 'incursion from another
dimension.'""
Barth understands God's being as act rather than e~sence.'~
But act
is not to be understood as something analogous to our human action^.'^
God conceived as act or event expresses the conception that God is an
ontic reality grounded not in an eternal essence but rather in his eternal

28"~veryparticular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of
every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou. Through this
mediation of the 7hou of all beings fulfilment, and non-fulfilment, of relations comes to
them: the inborn Thou is realised in each relation and consummated in none. It is
consummated only in the direct relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become
Itn (ibid., 75).
2 9 ~ m Brunner,
il
The Divine-Human Encounter, tr. Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1943), 87.
)O"~ut God is not a Person, but Person, absolutely; not a Subject but absolute
subject" (Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and
Knowledge, rr. Olive Wyon [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19461, 24).
3 1 ~ m iBrunner,
l
The Christian Doctrine of God, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1949), 266-270.
32~bid.,270. It should be noticed to his credit, however, that Brunner's concept of
God's eternity comes very close to the biblical historical temporal concept. However, the
specific rejection of temporal succession of past, present, and future in the divine life
contradicts Scripture and flows from the Platonic tradition he is trying to overcome.
Systematically, however, Brunner seems only to m o w rather than overcome the
timelessness of the classical conception of God's being and eternity.
33~runner,
Revelation and Reason, 30.
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decision to be what he is.36This act or event includes at the same time
God's being and his works.37The concept of revelation in Barth is
necessarily tied to the concept of God as act. "God is who He is in the
act of His revelation."" Because he is an act, God is a person who
realizes and unites in himself "the fullness of all being."39 In a very real
sense, then, God's act includes and causes not only himself but also the
entire universe of nature and history." In short, "God exists in His act.
God is His own decision. God lives from and by Himself."" In a true
systematic fashion Barth immediately adds that "whatever else we may
have to say must always correspond to this first definiti~n."~'
Furthermore, according to Barth this act or event who is God in
his revelation has been "executed once for all in eternity."" Barth has
wrestled extensively with the issue of God's eternity. He has attempted,
as has Brunner in a less technical and detailed way, to bring time into
the eternal act that is God. Barth is aware that an explanation of the
historicity of the cross is to be provided while at the same time leaving
undisturbed the traditional idea of God's timeless eternity. He discusses
the issue extensi~ely.~
Barth's position is only a minor modification of
the traditional timeless conception of God embraced notably by
Boethius and Thomas Aquinas." He declares that eternity is not
simplicity that excludes the complexities and manifoldness of time (past,
present, and future) and space, but on the contrary it includes in itself
the complexity of time but in a simultaneous way.& The succession of
36"The fact that God's being is event, the event of God's act, necessarily (if when
we speak of it, we turn our eyes solely on His revelation) means that it is His own
conscious, willed and executed decision" (ibid., 271).

#see for instance W, II/l, 608-677.

46"The being is eternal in whose duration beginning, succession and end are not
three but one, not separate as a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous
occasion as beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle
and end, and to that extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the sense in which in
himself and in all things God is simultaneous, i.e., beginning and middle as well as end,
without separation, distance or contradiction. Eternity is not, therefore, time, although
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time (past, present, and future), therefore, is still denied to the being and
act of God and his revelation. Thus, the basic ontological feature that
characterizes the very essence of a timeless interpretation of God's being
is still maintained by Barth. God's act of revelation, therefore, will not
occur in the order df succession of our time but rather in th; order of
the simultaneity of his eternity. As we will see later under content of
revelation, even the central event of Jesus Christ actually occurs in
God's (simultaneous time) rather than in our time.
~t this point variations between these main representatives of the
liberal model seem minimal. They do, however, set the stage for more
significant variations at the level of human activity and thi content of
revelation.
H u m a n Activity

The main reason for the existence of a liberal model of revelationinspiration is epistemological (interpretation of reason), rather than
ontological (interpretation of the being of God or man). The liberal
model of revelation replaces the classical interpretation of reason as
being the active intellect capable, with supernatural help, of reaching
into the timeless level of eternal divine truth, for with Kant's interpretation, reason is limited to the temporal-spatial realm. Truth about God,
says Schleiermacher, "could not proceed outwardly from any fact, and
even if it did in some incomprehensible way come to a human soul, it
could not be apprehended b; that soul, and retained as a thought; and
if it could not be in any way perceived and retained, it could not
become ~perative."~'
It must also be remembered that Kant's interpretation of human reason did not allow for the natural use of the active
intellect. Thus, it follows that if Kant's transcendentalism is accepted,
no room is allowed for the human intellect to be elevated in order to
reach the timeless divine truth at a supernatural level. O n the basis of
this epistemological switch, revelation cannot be said to occur in the
cognitive realm. Yet both Kant and Schleiermacher claim that, besides
being capable of reason and action, the human soul has the capability
of self-consciousness, that is, of a conscious awareness of itself.48
time is certainly God's creation or more correctly, a form of His creation. Time is
distinguished from eternity by the fact that in it beginning, middle and end are distinct
and even opposed as past, present and future" (ibid., 608).
47~chleiermacher,
The Christian Faith,

5

10 postscript.

48"~elf-consciousness"
is the technical term Schleiermacher uses to refer to feeling
and piety (The Christian Faith, 5 3, 4, yet it is not synonymous with them. Specifically,
Schleiermacher uses the term "self-consciousness"to avoid any use of "the word 'feeling'
in a sense so wide as to include unconscious statesn (ibid.). See Grenz, 44.
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Kant, speaking about aesthetics and art, defines feeling regarding
sensory experiences as an inner modification in consciousness of the
cognitive subject (self) about itself. The feeling experience gives rise to
contents of pleasure and displeasure, and these form the basis for "a
quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that contributes
nothing to kn~wledge."'~
Schleiermacher and the liberal model of theology take Kant's
concept of feeling and consider it as the technical, formal expression of
the religious idea of piety. Specifically, religious feelings are said to
occur in the area of human self-consciousness, which differs from
knowledge in that it is totally passive.50This is the area of the self in
which religion and revelation occur, taking place when God, the
Eternal, enters into an immediate relationship with the human being,
thereby originating piety or the feeling of absolute dependence within
human self-consciousness.51
Otto, basically agreeing with Schleiermacher,points out that there
must be a mental predisposition for revelation in man himself, "potentially present in the spirit as a dim or obscure a priori c ~ g n i t i o n . " ~ ~
However, this priori required to contact the numinous wholly other is
not reason but feeling, which Otto designates as "'creature-consciousness' or creature-feelingm5)The latter is basically defined as "the
emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness
in contrast to that which is supreme above all creature^."^'
Martin Buber analyzes the receptivity of man from the ontic rather
than the epistemological perspective considered by Schleiermacher and
Otto. Perception, knowledge, feeling, and imagination-according to
Buber-belong to the realm of it,that is, to the realm of things in space

4?Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Jdgment, tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1952), 42.
50~chleiermacher,
The Christian Faith, § 3, 3.
"This happens directly in one's self-consciousness without the intervention of
sensory perception or cognitive reason, and moreover the "self-identical essence of piety
is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of
being in relation to God" (see ibid., 5 4, 3).
5 2 0 t t 0 ,The Idea

of the Holy, 164.

5 3 " ~said
e above that the nature of the numinous can only be suggested by means
of the special way in which it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling. 'Its nature is
such that it grips or stirs the human mind with this and that determinate affective state'"
(ibid., 12).
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and time.55.The I-Thou world of timeless relation involves nature, men,
and intelligible forms." Consequently, human beings possess the ontic
capability for the existential encounter at the timeless level of the
Eternal tho^.^' Feelings play the same epistemological role but only as
a "mere accompaniment to the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of
the relation, which is fulfilled not in the soul but between I and
Thou."58The ontic receptivity of human existence emphasized by Buber
harmonizes with the epistemological receptivity of feelings suggested by
Schleiermacher and Otto.
Emil Brunner identifies "faith" as the human reception of
revelation. Faith is "first of all an act of knowledge."59However, we are
far from Aquinas's conception of faith residing in the intellect."
According to Brunner, reason functions within the "I-it," nonpersonal
dimension while faith works "in the 'I-Thou' dimension, as a perception
of the way in which love is recognized in love, and not in any other
way."ll So faith that receives revelation is an act of knowledge, not in
the intellectual rational sense, but rather in the timeless existential
personal sense. Brunner, then, understands faith as the human side of
the divine-human existential personal encounter. "In faith I do not
think, but God leads me to think; He does not communicate 'something' to me, but 'Him~elf.'"~~
So faith is knowledge but of a different
kind (personal-existential) which works within its own timeless level,
whereas reason works within the space-temporal dimension and the
subject-object structure of things ("I-It").63 Brunner disagrees with
Schleiermacher, Otto, and Buber in seeing human reason, rather than
feeling, as the cognitive capability that translates the personal existential
5 5 u ~perceive something. I am sensible to something. I imagine something. I will
something. I feel something. I think something. The life of human beings does not consist
of all this and the like alone. This and the like together establish the realm of Itn (ibid., 4).

57uTheThou meets me through grace-it is not found by seeking. But my speaking
of the primary word to it is an act of my being, is indeed the act of my being. The Thou
meets me. but I step into direct relation with it" (ibid., 11).

Revelation and Reason, 34.
59~runner,

60~quinas,
Surnnza theologica 2a-2ae, 4.2.
61~bid.,36.
62~runner,The Divine-Human Encounter, 85.
63"~evealedknowledge is poles apart from rational knowledge. These two forms
of knowledge are as far from each other as heaven is from earth" (Brunner, Revelation and
Reason, 16).
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content of revelation into knowledge and speech.64It should be noticed
here that Brunner seems to understand reason within the limits of
Kant's epistemology rather than according to the interpretation of the
Aristotelic-Thomistic tradition.
Barth's position develops at great length and with detailed technical
analysis a view in general similar to that of Brunner. However, he goes
beyond Brunner in clearly rejecting the existence of an a priori natural
capability of man for the reception of re~elation.~~.
Barth affirms that
God's act of revelation requires logically and necessarily a corresponding
capability for such an act in man.66However, in Barth's view God's act
of revelation by itself simultaneously and miraculously creates in man
the receptivity for revelation, namely faith.67 This existential and
timeless encounter affects the whole being of men including his "will
and conscience and feeling and all other anthropological center^."'^
It seems clear that according to the liberal model, the human
reception of God's timeless revelatory activity is displaced from reason
to a supposed timeless depth of man's being. This existential (ontic)
encounter indirectly also affects man's consciousness (epistemological
level) either in the area of feeling and imagination or even in the realm
of reason understood within the temporal limits expressed in Kant's
epistemology.

The Essence or Nature of Revelation
Revelation, according to Schleiermacher,is a "divine and therefore
eternal act."" Within a Kantian interpretation of the presuppositional
structure, it is impossible to accept that God's revelatory activity
operating "upon man as a cognitive beingm7'can become an important

h here is no human awareness corresponding to the divine utterance (CD V1, 149).
"Where God speaks, it is meaningless to cast about for the corresponding act" (ibid., 162,
224).
67~arth
explains "that the possibility of knowing corresponding to the real Word
of God has simply come to him, man, that it sets forth a quite inconceivable novum in
direct contrast to all his ability and capacity, and is only to be regarded as a pure fact, like
the Word of God itself" (ibid., 222).

23 1.
68~bid.,

701bid., § 10 postscript. Here Schleiennacher's acceptance of Kant's epistemological
theory can be detected. Religion does not belong either to the scientific or ethical realms
(On Religion: Speeches to Its Culturad Despisers, tr. Richard Crouter [Cambridge, Engl.:
Cambridge University Press, 19881, 77). Nash is correct in labeling this position

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION:THE LIBERAL MODEL

181

central feature of the liberal model of revelation-inspiration. If revelation
cannot occur on the cognitive level, the only possible way to argue in
favor of both the possibility and reality of divine revelation is to find
in man a realm other than reason in which revelation would be possible. This is precisely the key to the liberal model suggested by
Schleiermacher. Divine revelation operates within the realm of man's
feelings (piety) conceived as a faculty besides reason (science) and action
(morals)." It can be clearly perceived that if God's eternal revelatory
activity reaches human feelings, rather than human reason, it cannot
communicate divine truths or propositions. According to the liberal
model, divine revelation is possible and real. Yet, it produces no
knowledge, information, meaning, or propositions, but rather a feeling
of absolute dependence. God's action, then, appears only as the
"whence" and the "co-determinant" of such a feeling." Schleiermacher
has clearly summarized the liberal position regarding the essence of
revelation and inspiration by remarking that "revelation is only to be
assumed when not a single moment but a whole existence is determined
by such a divine communication, and that what is then proclaimed by
such an existence is to be regarded as revealed."73
Otto follows Schleiermacher's epistemological approach rather than
exploring the ontic existential foundation of such an epistemology of
self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence. According to
Otto the essence of revelation consists in the human experience of the
"numinous."
As was already pointed out, the "numinous" is "mysterious." That
the "numinous" we experience is "mysterious" means that it "is beyond
our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge
has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently 'wholly other' whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a
wonder that strikes us chill and numb."" This experience, as in
"theologicalagnosticism"(374), which is certainly a result of Kant's agnosticism. However,
considering that agnosticism is the limitation of knowledge to a certain area rather than
the total absence of knowledge, one could argue that the liberal model embraces an
absolute form of theological agnosticism which amounts to systematic theological
skepticism.
71Schleiermacher,On Religion,

89-90.

72~chleiermacher,
The Christian Faith, § 4, 4. The consensus of liberal theologians
during the last two centuries, that "God has not spoken, and indeed, cannot speakn (Nash,
373), seems to be a consequence of Schleiermacher's interpretation of revelation.
73~bid.,
§ 10, postscript.
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Schleiermacher,cannot produce knowledge but only "creature-feeling."75
In a clear sense, then, Otto's view also proposes a noncognitive origin
of revelation.
According to Buber, revelation occurs as an existential encounter
in the mutuality of the "I-Thoun relation. The essence of this encounter
is that it connects the existence of God with the existence of man. That
encounter occurs in the timelessness of the "I-Thou" relation. Consequently, in the encounter of revelation "man receives, and he receives
no specific 'content' but a Presence, a Presence as power."" However,
in the personal encounter "there is the inexpressible confirmation of
meaning. Meaning is assured. Nothing can any longer be meaningle~s."~~
Yet this meaning received in the encounter cannot "be transmitted and
made into knowledge generally current and admi~sible."~~
Buber's
conception of the essence of revelation as noncognitive existential
encounter is clearly visible in the following passage.
That before which, in which, out of which, and into which we live,
even the mystery, has remained what it was. It has become present
to us and in its presentness has proclaimed itself to us as salvation;
we have "known" it, but we acquire no knowledge from it which
might lessen or moderate its mysteriousness.79

In no uncertain terms Brunner agrees that in essence revelation is
a noncognitive, non-historical, existential event that takes place at the
the "I-Thoun level.80
Karl Barth is also convinced that divine revelation is essentially a
divine, personal, nnoncognitive nonhistorical event in the order of
everyday temporal succe~sion.~~
However, Barth goes a step further in
75 For "creature-feelingnto arise "there must be something 'numinous', something
bearing the character of a 'numen', to which the mind turns spontaneously" (Otto, The
Idea of the Holy, 11).

76~uber,
I and Thou, 110.
77~bid.

instance, Brunner explains that "in dealing with genuine, primary faith, i.e.,
when God reveals Himself to me in His Word, we are not then concerned with a
'something.' In His Word, God does not deliver to me a course of lectures in dogmatic
theology, He does not submit to me or interpret for me the content of a confession of
faith, but He makes Himself accessible to me" (The Divine-Human Encounter, 84, c.f. 87,
89). See also idem, Revelation and Reason, 8, 27, 2830-31; and Theology of Crisis, 32-35.

"1n its ultimate sense, *God's Word is not a thing to be described, nor is it a
concept to be defined. It is neither a content nor an idea. It is not 'a truth,' not even the
very highest truth. It is the truth because it is God's person speaking, Dei loquentis
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claiming that the "Eternal Act of His Word" as it is spoken also
includes and generates a historical "corespondent" in the created realm
that always is co-given or accompanies the inner grounding revelatory
spiritual act.82This historical correspondent to the "Eternal Act of the
Word of God," however, is not to be identified with the essence of
R e ~ e l a t i o nBarth
. ~ ~ seems to introduce this variation in order to make
room, within the liberal model of revelation, for the biblical claim that
Jesus Christ is "the objective reality of revelation," in other words, that
"according to Holy Scripture God's revelation takes place in the fact
that God's Word became a man and that this man has become God's
Word. The incarnation of the eternal Word, Jesus Christ, is God's
revelation."" This historical correspondent plays a significant role in
Barth's
on the content of revelation which is discussed in our
next section.
By now the fact that the essence of the liberal model of revelation
and inspiration does not belong to the realm of knowledge but rather
to the inner realm of personal noncognitive encounter with God has
become clear. Thus, the divine-human encounter which constitutes the
essence of revelation takes place within the realm of man's selfconsciousness and feeling, and in that realm it originates in the
environment of noncognitive, timeless, existential personal encounter.85
persona. It is not something objective. It is the objective, because it is the subjective,
namely, God's subjective. God's word means God speaking" ( W , V1, 155). God's speech
is equal to his eternal act, that is equal to who he is. In other words Barth is not
contradicting himself when he talks about Dei loquentis persona because the loquentis is
equal to his eternal act and does not belong to the level of history and therefore of reason,
imagination, feeling, and action.

8 3 ~ a r thimself
h
explains that since "the Word of God is itself God's act," "it has nothing to do with the general problem of historical understanding. Of course the question
of some sort of historical understanding always arises when the Word of God is manifest
to us in its contemporaneousness.But it is not that sort of historical understanding as such
which signifies the hearing, and is the basis of the proclamation, of the Word of God.
Where the Word of God is heard and proclaimed, something happens which in spite of
all interpretative skill cannot be brought about by interpretative skill" ( W V1, 168).

84WI/2, 1; see 1-44.
8 5 ~his
n On Religion, Schleiermacher had already stated that the divine encounter
"is not really a separate moment at all. The penetration of existence within this immediate
union ceases as soon as it reaches consciousness. Then a vivid and clear perspective arises
before you, like the image of an absent mistress in the eyes of her young lover; or feeling
works its way out from deep within you and spreads over your whole being, like the
blush of modesty and love over a young girl's face." He concludes "that what we have to
do with here is beyond time and yet, precisely because of this, is rightly placed at the apex
of dl things temporaln(87-88).
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In the preceding section it has been shown that man has a passive
capability to be acted upon by the timeless divine activity which
grounds the personal encounter structure.
The Content of Revelation
Because in the liberal model the content of revelation is the
noncognitive, divine-human encounter, it follows that no idea, information, or words are originated by the divine activity. The event of
revelation communicates neither timeless nor temporal historical truths.
The way in which this content is "translated" into historically
conditioned ideas and words will be dealt with later on under the
section on inspiration. But before we move on to consider the way in
which the liberal model conceives the way in which Scripture was
written down, it is necessary to consider whether the historical
temporal existence of Jesus of Nazareth plays any role as source of
biblical content or whether it is only the product of the religious
imagination of the community.
Otto criticizes Schleiermacher's position because he conceives
Christ only "as the supreme divining subject, not as the object of
divination par e~ceZ1ence."~~
Otto asks whether it would be possible to
conceive Christ in harmony with Christianity's claim that in his own
person he is "'holiness made manifest', that is, a person in whose being,
life, and mode of living we realize of ourselves by 'intuition and feeling'
the self-revealingpower and presence of the Godhead."" Otto's proposal
is worked out in Kantian terms. Against Schleiermacher Otto suggests
that divination is not a universal faculty shared by every human being.
Only some holy men and prophets have the capability to experience the
numinous and express it in their own lives, acts, and words. In this way
these men become objective revelations of holiness made manifest. We
are able to recognize these men, notably Christ, as objective impressions
of the numen on us because a priori, in our own inner consciousness,
we possess an "element of cognition, comprehension, and valuation,"
namely, the category of the holy. Thus, the numinous "impression"
made by Christ in us is not the result of every-day historical
occurrekes but rather of the a priori category of the hdly which allows
us to discover in the man Jesus' divination his objective experience of

%3tto, B e Idea of the Holy, 159.Otto defines divination as the faculty "of genuinely
cognizing and recognizing the holy in its appearances" (ibid., 148).
87~bid.,
159.
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the numinous." In this indirect sense, then, it could be said that Jesus
is also the content of revelation.
Brunner seems to go further than Otto. He boldly states that a
person "in space and time, is himself the Word. The Word of God,
because it is a personal word, is present as a person. This is what the
Christian calls revelation; 'the Word was made flesh and we have seen
his glory.'"" Yet, Brunner hastens to qualify this statement by warning
us that the revelation of the Word in space and time is not direct and
consequently should not be confused with "miraculous theophanies.""
The revelation of the Word in space and time, explains Brunner, is
indirect. "Thus the historical appearance of the human personality of
Jesus is not, as such, revelation; it is revelation only in so far as in this
historical, human personality the eternal Son of God is recognized. The
incognito of his historical appearance can be pierced only by the eye of
faith."91 It is difficult to see how either Otto's or Brunner's position
could take the historical Jesus as a direct source of revelation. It seems
that only the timeless, noncognitive existential divine-human encounter
and its salvific experience is the content of revelation.
Barth's articulation of the content of revelation is more elaborate.
He certainly agrees that the existential encounter produced by the
"Eternal Act of the Word" in man is the content of revelation to which
the Bible writers are witnesses. As does Brunner, Barth also attempts to
go beyond the existential encounter to include Christ as the content of
revelation. Consequently, it is not infrequent to read statements to the
effect that revelation is equal with Jesus Christ. For instance, early in
his Church Dogmatics Barth affirms that "revelation in fact does not
differ from the Person of Jesus Christ, and again does not differ from
the reconciliation that took place in Him. To say revelation is to say,
'The Word became flesh.'"92
However, Barth also identifies Jesus Christ with the eternal
nonhistorical act of God's Word which is the core of revelation as
existential encounter.93Here Barth works on the basis of the idea that

89~runner,
?he Theology of

Cisis, 34.

?tbid., 34.

'l~bid.,35.
92~arth,W V1, 134.
93~arth's
scheme requires three levels of "time"or "history" to explain the phenomenon of the revelation of the Word of God in the man Jesus of Nazareth. First he
speaks of God's own being as not timeless but rather "historical even in its eternity" (CD,
Wl, 66). This "historicity"of God is conceived to be the very source of time (ibid., 67).
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in its essence the act of revelation creates its external correspondent in
the world of space and time. These external correspondents are called
"signs." He points out that "among the signs of the objective reality of
revelation we have to understand certain definite events and relations
and orders within the world in which revelation is an objective reality,
and therefore within the world which is also our world, the world of
nature and history."94In this way Barth explains the historical facts
(fallen, historicist history) in Scripture including Israel's history, Jesus
of Nazareth, and the Christian church.95
Ontologically natural and historical phenomena become signs
because they are chosen by the eternal act of God to play that role.%
The historicist meaning of nature or history has nothing to do in the
choosing. As a matter of fact, Barth clearly states that the whole of
signs contained in biblical history "might equally well have been quite
different."" Moreover, epistemologically, between the external sign
(historicist time) and the internal reality of the Word of God (eternal
time of God and grace) there can be only a correspondence of contradicThis historical eternity however is conceived by Barth as simultaneity, where the proper
succession that belongs to the essence of time does not exist (ibid.; see the detailed
discussion on God's eternity in W, II/1,608-677). On the contrary, simultaneity logically
and traditionally describes the very essence of timelessness. Second, Barth speaks of the
W l , 75). This time is
mutually corresponding times of creation and redemption
grounded in grace and "is constituted by God's own presence in Jesus Christ in the world
created by Him" (ibid., 73). The description of this time of grace, the time of the incarnation, is made by Barth in temporal terms that clearly assume the absence of temporal
succession, that is, the time of the incarnation is still not time but eternity (ibid., 73-79.
Finally, Barth speaks of "fallen time" that is our time. "It is the time whose flux has
become a flight." Barth recognizes that this "is our only time" (ibid., 7). When Barth
turns to the issue of historicity he affirms that the historicity of creation and grace is
nonhistorical in the historicist sense. Historicist history is our real history in the order
of succession. Creation, redemption, and therefore revelation occur in the nonhistorical
part of what Barth also calls "prehistory." It seems clear, then, that the encounter of
revelation and the act of the revelation in the incarnation of Jesus Christ belong to the
nonhistorical side, closer to the eternal act of God.

(a,

9
4 I/&
~ 223.
~ "The fact that God's revelation is also a sign-giving is one side, the
objective side, as it were, of its subjective reality" (ibid., 224).

9 6 ~ h eeternal "choosing" is explained by Barth in the case of the historicist
humanity of Jesus Christ as an eternal assumptio which amounts to an eternal adoptionism
in which the historicist human nature of Jesus of Nazareth is assumed in the eternal act
that God is (ibid., 155). In short, for Barth the Johannine egeneto amounts to the eternal
adoption of the man Jesus of Nazareth (ibid., 159-171). By virtue of that adoption the
historical Jesus can be the external form of the Word of God that remains always the
same.
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tion. Barth specifically clarifies that "the place where God's Word is
manifest is, objectively and subjectively, the cosmos in which sin rules.
The form of the Word of God is therefore really that of the cosmos
which stands in contradiction to God. It as little has in it the capacity
of revealing God to us as we on our part have the capacity for knowing
God in it."98
Here we face a clearly ontological and epistemological duality in
the Platonic and Kantian traditions. In their being chosen by God the
signs have a reality and meaning (eternal time, time of grace) different
and contradictory to the reality and meaning that correspond to them
in the real world of space and time.99The duality between timelessness
and temporality stems from Platonic tradition; the rejection of analogy
between the two orders stems from the Kantian tradition. Truly, signs,
including Scripture which is obviously a sign also, are sacraments whose
meaning, always given, not by the external form, but by the internal,
spiritual act of the Word of God, is always one and the same
"iustif2catio or sanctificatio hornini~."'~
By way of conclusion on the content of revelation we can suggest
that Barth clearly teaches that the ultimate content of Scripture is
always the existential encounter produced, via sacrament, by the
"Eternal Act of the Word of God." In that he agrees with the liberal
model. On the ontological side, however, his conception of the omnipotence and sovereignty of the eternal act of God seems to suggest that
biblical writers were also given by God some "signs" or "forms" in
historicist history. These could be considered as "content" of revelation,
though of a different and lower kind that the real revelation in the
Word. These signs basically would include the history of Israel and the
life of Jesus of Nazareth. From the epistemological point of view,
however, the one in which this article is interested, Barth's explanation
that God assumed the historicist history of the sign, which is worked
out not by him directly, but by the human agent, seems to suggest that
biblical authors were able to identify God's signs, the external form of
his Word, only on the basis of their personal noncognitive encounter
with God. Either way it seems that Barth has made an effort to suggest
that the content of revelation attested by the biblical writers also
includes natural and historical phenomena chosen by God, mainly the
history of Israel and the life of Jesus Christ. Yet because of his clear
emphasis that the real content of revelation consists not in its external

lW1bid.,230; see also 228-232.
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form (sign) but rather in the noncognitive, nonhistorical existential
encounter in which God meets human beings, Barth evidently works
within the liberal model of revelation-inspiration.
It seems clear that according to the liberal model. the ideas,
information, concepts, and data we find in Scripture have been
epistemologically originated by human cognitive activity without any
contribution from God. The entire contents of Scripture, then, are
human and historically conditioned. Thus, the liberal model of
revelation juxtaposes the divine and the human in such a way that the
contact between them does not involve any direct communication of
truth or information, but rather provides an indirect stimulus to write
(within historical limitations) abdut that which properly belongs to the
timeless level of reality, namely, God and the religious experience.
The liberal model includes a variety of submodels which identify
revelation with a specific kind of divine activity;lolyet, these submodels
always work within the parameters drawn by the liberal model of
revelation. Thus, Avery Dulles' classification of models of revelation"Revelation as History," "Revelation as Inner Experience," "Revelation
as Dialectical Presence," and "Revelation as New Awarenessn-appears
to set forth variations or submodels of the liberal model.lo2

3. Inspiration in the Liberal Model
The liberal model maintains that the process of writing down
Scriptures is essentially "an exclusively human activity."lo3The human
writer of Scripture worked only with historically conditioned contents.
No special divine charism is claimed to have assisted biblical writers.
However, there is a way in which this model traces religious discourse
back to God: The inner timeless encounter of absolute dependence is
considered to be the ultimate cause that motivates the origination of all
religious discourse, including, of course, the Bible.
Schleiermacher connects the feeling of absolute dependence with
the origin of biblical and dogmatic writings by claiming that human self
-consciousness includes two inseparable, interconnected levels, one
sensible and the other absolute. Consequently, he speaks of an absolute

'Ol~orthe existence of Merent levels of models and paradigms, see, e.g., Kiing, 134-

135.

lo2Dulles,Models, 53-114; see also 27.
'03~ix,456; see also Nash, 375, and Gordon Lewis, "The Human Authorship of
Inspired Scripture,"in Inwrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 19801,
23 1-233.
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and a sensible self-consciousness or feeling.lo4.Absolute self-consciousness is able "to manifest itself in time, by entering into relation with the
sensible self-consciousnessso as to constitute a moment."105Thus, since
within human self-consciousness the feeling of absolute dependence
(originated by a timeless God) always co-occurs with feelings of pleasure
and pain (originated by sensory temporal experiences), the feeling of
absolute dependence is always linked to the content of the sensible selfconsciousness through which it expresses itself. In the very instant of its
origination, this content becomes the content of its external historical
manifestation, and when the feeling of absolute dependence is linked to
it, the result is emotion.lo6Even when emotions express the feeling- of
absolute dependence, they are not knowledge, however, for they belong
to the precognitive level of inner self-consciousness. Consequently, the
writing down of religious literature becomes "the attempt to translate
the inward emotions into
Biblical teachings, and Christian
doctrines as well, are "nothing but the expressions given to the
Christian self-consciousness and its conne~ions."'~~
As we have already pointed out, Otto, following Schleiermacher's
lead, speaks of a human faculty of divination that allows some to
gennuinely cognize and recognize "the holy in its appearances."lo9These
cognitions, however, are not identified with rational knowledge but
rather with intuitions of the eternal beyond the temporal, which "in
turn, assume shape in definite statements and propositions, capable of
a certain groping formulation, which are not without analogy with.
theoretic propositions, but are to be clearly distinguished from them by
their free and merely felt, not reasoned, character."l1°
The process of writing down the existential content of revelation
is for Buber a process of translation or transmutation between two
incompatible orders, the "I-Thou" order of the eternal encounter and
the "I-It" order of spatio-temporal objectivity and know1edge.l"
The Christiarr Faith, 5, 4-5.
104~chleiermacher,

lo71bid.,§ 13, postscript.
'081bid. See also § 16, postscript.
lo90tto, l%eIdea of the Holy, 148.
'''The writer needs "to grasp as an object that which he has seen with the force of
presence, he will have to compare it with objects, establish it in its order among classes
of objects, describe and analyze it objectively. Only as It can it enter the structure of
knowledge" (Buber, I and Thou, 40).
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Brunner explicitly rejects the classical theory of verbal
inspiration.l12 However, he explicitly affirms the guidance of the Holy
Spirit on the Bible writers (inspiration) but in a way that does not rule
out "human search, human weakness, and the possibility of mistakes in
action and in behavior."l13 The real problem, however, in Brunner's
doctrine of inspiration is determined by his previously formulated
concept of revelation as a timeless, nonhistorical, noncognitive
existential encounter within the "I-Thou" order. After such an
encounter the Bible writer "speaks about God, about his Lord, Christ;
God is now the Object of his pro~lamation."~~~
Clearly following the
same general pattern established by Buber, Brunner claims that the
written "word of the Apostle through preaching stands, as mediator,
between the 'Thou-word' through which he became an Apostle, and the
'Thou-word' through which the 'other' becomes a believer, through
which the Christian community, the Church, comes into being."l15
Obviously this same structure applies to the written word in Scripture.
The written word is the It that as a sacrament mediates between the
two divine actions in the apostle and the believer. The content, of
course, comes from the Eternal 75ou of God and not from the written
form or content of the It order of human language.
Barth also clearly rejects the seventeenth-century doctrine of
inspiration "as false doctrine."l16 The process by which Scripture was
written is conceived to be a purely human process of "witnessing to
revelation."l17 As witnesses to revelation, human authors created by
their own agency the formal, temporal, external, cognitive "correspondent" or "written sign" to the eternal spiritual existential noncognitive
Act of the Word of God.l18 The human element does not cease to be
lt2~runner,
Revelation and Rmm,127- 130.

118"~t
is quite impossible that there should be a direct identity between the human
word of Holy Scripture and the Word of God, and therefore between the creaturely
reality in itself and as such and the reality of God the Creator. It is impossible that there
should have been a transmutation of the one into the other or an admixture of the one
with the other. This is not the case even in the person of Christ where the identity
between God and man, in all the originality and indissolubility in which it confronts us,
is an assumed identity" (CD V 2 , 499). Barth goes on to draw an analogy between the
incarnation of the Word in the humanity of Christ and the humanity of Scripture (ibid.,
500-501). As discussed earlier in this article, in both cases the human part is eternally
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human, as well as fully and totally historically conditioned.l19 It
necessarily follows that errors are contained in Scripture.120
As we already pointed out, the content of revelation according to
Barth consists in the internal, timeless, nonhistorical, "Eternal Act of
His Word" and the external correspondent of historical and natural
signs, including the history of Israel and the life of Jesus of Nazareth,
willed and assumed in the very self-same act. It is easy to see how
biblical writers acting within their natural and therefore fallible
cognitive capacities may have gathered historical information from their
own witnessing of facts or through a process of oral or written
tradition. Yet, were they also able to talk about the real content of
revelation, the nonhistorical, noncognitive encounter with the Word of
God? Barth answers in the affirmative. The activity of speaking about
the Word of God is characterized, in good liberal terms, as divination,
while the language produced by divination is characterized as saga.
Thus, divination is the cognitive process by which the unaided human
intuition attempts to translate the timeless existential content of the
encounter into the contradictory realm of time and space thus
It
~roducinga written account under the category of saga (poetry).121
chosen, assumed, or adopted by God's eternal decision. Ontologically, then, it can be said
that God is the ultimate cause of the external form or sign. Epistemologically, though,
that is regarding its actual content and meaning, it is entirely caused by the temporal,
historical, historicist nature of the human being and reason. For a discussion of Barth's
analogy between Christ and Scripture, see Frank Hasel, "The Christological Analogy of
Scripture in Karl Barth," 72 50 (1994): 41-49.
l19Talkingabout the human authors of Scripture, Barth remarks that "their action
was their own, and like every human action, an act conditioned by and itself conditioning
its temporal and spatial environment" (W V2, 505). "Not only part but all that they say
is historically related and conditioned" (ibid., 509).
120~rophets
and apostles "even in their office, even in their function as witnesses,
even in the act of writing down their witness, were real, historical men as we are, and
therefore sinful in their action, and capable and actually guilty of error in their spoken
and written word" (ibid., 529).
l2'~egardingthe nature of human language about the objective revelation produced
by the Word of God, Barth argues the "in addition to the 'historical' there has always
been a legitimate 'non-historical' and
view of history, and its 'non-historical'
and pre-historical depiction in the form of saga" (W,W l , 81). Saga is clearly defined as
"an intuitive and poetic picture of a prehistorical reality of history which is enacted once
and for all within the confines of time and space" (ibid.). The cognitive process by which
the intuitive translation of the nonhistorical to the historical is understood by Barth as
divination, which "means the vision of the historical emergence which precedes 'historical'
events and which can be guessed from that which has emerged and in which 'historical'
history takes place" (ibid., 83). In short, divination "looks to the basic and impelling
occurrence behind the everyday aspect of history, where the latter is not only no less
history than on this everyday aspect but has indeed its source and is to that extent history
in a hgher sense" (ibid.).
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should be remembered (1) that such a translation is made between
incompatible nonanalogical levels, and (2) that in the first level we not
only have no space and time but also no knowledge as we know it, and
(3) that the intuition and linguistic expression is made by fallen men
without any supernatural aid.lu According to Barth, then, Scripture is
a humanly conceived and ~roduceddocument which generally is a mixture of history and saga, with some exceptional occurrence of either
pure saga (as in the creation accounts) or pure h i ~ t 0 r y . N
l ~o~ divinely
originated cognitive contents are to be found in the whole of Scripture.
Scripture itself is one of the many external historical signs that God uses
sacramentally, in connection with which God may choose to produce
the existential encounter in the be1ie~er.l~~
Finally, if inspiration may still refer to a divine influence on the
writing of Scripture, the liberal model, following Schleiermacher's lead,
seems to favor a switch regarding the locus where such activity might
be recognized from the individual to the social l e ~ e 1 . Accordingly,
l~~
inspiration would work, not on the writers, but rather on the entire
community that historically conditions the contents of emotions,
knowledge, and words utilized by these writers. This "socialn view of
inspiration, however, does not change the fact that the epistemological
origin of Scripture is human.
It is possible to say, then, that the liberal model of inspiration has
no place for direct divine activity in the cognitive-linguisticprocess of
writing Scripture. The writing of Scripture was achieved by the power
of human imagination, which replaces reason. In essence, moreover, the
process of writing Scripture was historical and therefore fallible and
limited.126Borrowing the terms utilized by the classical model, it is
possible to suggest that according to the liberal model the reach of
human activity in the writing of Scripture is full and plenary. By the
same token the divine activity seems to be eliminated fully and
completely.

122Thatis why Barth comments that divination "looksto the point where from the
standpoint of 'history' everything is dark, although in fact it is only from this point that
'history' can emerge and be clear" (ibid., 83).

12%eeThe Christian Faith, 5 130.
126~onsequently,
the liberal model of revelation-inspirationallows for errors to be
found not only in biblical expressions but also in biblical teachings. Moreover, the task
of theology includes the discovering and elimination of such errors.
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4 . Implications for Theology
A study of the far-reaching implications of the acceptance of the
liberal model of revelation-inspiration for the constitution of Christian
theology cannot be probed in-this article. But the importance of such
a study cannot be understated, since the liberal model seems to have
been accepted in the theological circles of a vast majority of Christian
den0minati0ns.l~~
Therefore, it is appropriate to outline some of the
results of applying the liberal model of revelation-inspiration to Scripture as the source of theological data in order to have a better understanding of the full theological significance of this model. First of all, it
should be noticed that since according to the liberal model the contents
and words of Scripture are not produced by human reason but by
human imagination,12' Christian theology is left without objective cognitive foundations. Theological pluralism becomes an unavoidable result
Second, since biblical
of the liberal model of revelation-in~pirati0n.l~~
words and meanings are wholly human, biblical exegesis is to be undertaken with the same tools and procedures utilized by the historical and
literary sciences.130Third, liberal theology has felt free to play, so to
speak, with the biblical contents in their possible role as sources of
theology, which are processed mainly under two basic categories: history and literature. Because the content of theology in the liberal model
is not historical but rather transcendent and timeless, such play has no
direct bearing on the constitution and determination of the contents of
Christian theology. And fourth, philosophy, science, tradition, and
experience are called by the liberal model to play a grounding role as
sources of theology, a role that properly belongs to Scripture.
5 . Conclusion

In my previous article the classical model was explored. In this one,
with the description of the most common general features of the liberal
127~tsoutreach is said to include, among others, Roman Catholicism (Schijkel, 218)
and most Southern Baptist seminaries and colleges (Nash, 34). Gordon Lewis has studied
the case of Berkouwer, who began with the classical model of revelation-inspiration,but
later switched to the liberal model (236). This case should not be considered an isolated
one, however.

'*'The role of imagination in the constitution of theology has been given extensive
analytical and technical consideration in David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination:
Christian Beology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 198 1).
129SeeSchleiermacher, The Christian Faith, $ 10, postscript.
130see ibid., S 27, 3, and S 130, 2.
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model, we have completed our historical journey in search of the general
characteristics of the models by which the explanation of the epistemological
origin of Scripture has been formulated throughout the history of Christian
theology. As the reader may have noticed, my purpose was not and is not
to criticize either model. It is my personal opinion that one has to recognize
that both models have been developed with a high degree of inner
coherence and that both are theoretically possible. The purpose for
describing both the classical and liberal models was to provide the necessary
context to help us to see whether a proper explanation of the epistemological origin of Scripture may require a new model or whether Christian
theology can still attempt its proper task by utilizing various versions of the
existing models.
~iom
the brief analytical description of the classical and liberal models
of revelation and inspiration, it seems possible to draw at least the following
general conclusions:
First, as the consequences of both models are briefly considered it
becomes apparent that great portions of Scripture (classical model) or the
whole content of Scripture (liberal model) are rendered practically irrelevant
as sources of theology. Thus, Christian theology is driven to draw the
contents for its doctrines more from science, philosophy, experience, and
tradition than from Scripture. Only when inspiration is understood as
revelation in the classical model or, to put it in another way, when in the
classical model inspiration is disconnected from the doctrine of revelation,
the whole of Scripture becomes theoretically authoritative as a source of
theology in its entirety.
Second, the formulation of the liberal model of inspiration and
revelation was required by epistemological changes produced within the
presuppositional framework that contradicted the presuppositions utilized
by the classical model. Accordingly, human consciousness came to be
conceived as limited to the historical realm, and therefore, unable to have
cognitive contact with a nonhistorical, nontemporal reality, namely God.
Third, both models seem to have difficulties integrating the two main
types of data that should be accounted for in any doctrine of revelationinspiration. These main types of data are (1) what Scripture says about itself
(biblical doctrine about itself) and (2) what Scripture is (phenomena of
Scripture). The classical model seems to have difficulties in properly
accounting for the phenomena of Scripture, while the liberal model appears
to find greater difficulty in following what Scripture says about itself.
Fourth, both models seem to be incapable of providing an explanation
of the epistemological origin of Scripture in which both the divine and the
human agencies are properly recognized in their spec& contributions to the
constitution of biblical contents and words. Again, the classical model has
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difficulties accounting for the contributions of the human agency while the
liberal model is unable to properly include the divine as depicted in
Scripture.
Fifth, it seems clear that the difficulties presented so far are the result
of the presuppositional structure on which these models are built. The
common denominator shared by these two models comes into view when
their conviction that God's nature and activities are to be interpreted as
timeless is uncovered. The analysis of these two models, then, seems to
indicate that a timeless interpretation of the divine being and its activity is
the structural cause of the shortcomings each model appears unable to
overcome.
Sixth, the reason why both models follow a timeless interpretation of
God lies in the fact that neither of them follow the methodological principle
of soh Scriptura but rather build their views utilizing extrabiblical
philosophical principles and methodologies.
Finally, in their departure from the soh Scriptura principle, both
models follow a procedure that is essentially unscientific. A methodology
that interprets an object according to categories that are alien to it seems to
ignore the basic scientific principle according to which any object of
scientific inquiry should be allowed to express itself freely and fully. A
scientific approach to the study of the epistemological origin of Scripture,
then, can neither follow the classical nor liberal models of revelationinspiration because they apply to the object of study presuppositions that
are alien to it. A scientific approach to the investigation of the
epistemological origin of Scripture should be built on the basis of a total
commitment to the soh Scriptura principle from which both the
presuppositional structure and the data for a new model of revelation and
inspiration must flow.
These brief suggestions regarding the common characteristicsshared by
the classical and liberal models of revelation-inspiration seem to indicate the
necessity not only for the formulation of a new model, but also, once it is
built, that its theological consequences be followed. Such a new model
should be built on the basis of the biblical ground uncovered in my first
article and following the methodology discussed in the second. Once the
possibility, methodology, and need for the development of a new model of
revelation and inspiration have been explored, we may dedicate attention to
the actual formulation of the basic structure of the new model. Later will
come the actual development of a fullfledged theory of revelation and
inspiration that may discuss in a detailed way all the issues that are, in one
way or another, related to the epistemological origin of Scripture.

